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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ABANDONMENT OF THE TWO-PRONGED AGUILAR-
SPINELLI TEST: ILLINoIs V CATES
The Supreme Court developed the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test
to guide magistrates in determining when an informant's tip furnishes
probable cause to issue a search warrant.' Under the test, a police of-
ficer applying for a warrant had to present the magistrate with a factual
showing of both the informant's basis of knowledge and either the credi-
bility of the informant or the reliability of his information. 2 The two-
pronged test accommodated law enforcement interests by allowing
search warrants based on informant tips. At the same time, it fostered
fourth amendment protections by requiring that only reliable, trustwor-
thy tips be used.
In Illinois v. Gates,3 the Supreme Court abandoned the Aguilar-
Spinelli two-pronged test and replaced it with an approach that consid-
ers the "totality of circumstances." 4 The Court argued that a totality of
circumstances approach traditionally has guided probable cause deter-
minations. The majority also claimed that the two-pronged test was un-
duly rigid and technical. These reasons, however, do not support
rejection of the Aguilar-Spinelli test. 5 In addition, Gates does more than
replace the two-pronged test with a simpler, more practical standard; it
drastically expands the opportunity for police to use less than reliable
information as a basis for warrants.6 The Court could have better
served both fourth amendment and police interests by retaining and
clarifying the two-pronged test.
I
BACKGROUND
A. Theoretical Framework
The fourth amendment requires that police magistrates issue search
I See infra notes 30-36, 38-46 and accompanying text.
2 Id
3 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
4 See id. at 2332. The Aguilar-Spinli test was developed in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
5 See infra notes 71-125 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 125-33 and accompanying text.
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warrants only upon a showing of probable cause. 7 Because only relia-
ble, trustworthy information can establish probable cause, the fourth
amendment sometimes collides with law enforcement interests by limit-
ing the use of suspicious but useful information as a basis for warrants. 8
Informant tips, which often provide police with valuable investigative
assistance, are highly suspicious information because often little is
known about the informant or the reliability of his information. 9 The
Supreme Court developed the Aguilar-Spineli two-pronged test' 0 to
guide magistrates in determining when an informant's tip furnishes
probable cause. Under the test, a police officer applying for a warrant
had to present the magistrate with facts indicating both the informant's
basis of knowledgeI' and the credibility of the informant or the reliabil-
7 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. The fourth amendment thus bars the issuance of search warrants
not supported by probable cause. In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), the
Court defined probable cause to exist "where 'the facts and circumstances within [the police
officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] suffi-
cient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has
been or is being committed." Id. at 175-76 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
162 (1925)) (footnote omitted).
In certain limited circumstances, lawful searches may be conducted without a search
warrant. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106-07 & n.2 (1964). Seegenerally Note,
The Infomer's Tip as Probable Cause for Search or Arrest, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 958, 958-59 n.2
(1969) (discussion of relationship between warranted and warrantless searches). The
Supreme Court has strongly indicated its preference for warranted searches, see Ventresca, 380
U.S. at 106-07, even though the same probable cause standard applies to both types of
searches. See 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.3, at 184 (1984). In
warranted searches, a neutral, independent magistrate determines whether probable cause
exists; in warrantless search situations, a possibly subjective and emotional police officer
makes the determination. Id. at 185-86.
A "magistrate" is the judicial officer charged with determining whether probable cause
exists to support the issuance of a search warrant.
8 See Hall, Police andLaw in a Democratic Society, 28 IND. L.J. 133, 174 (1953). The fourth
amendment often conflicts with the state's interest in effective law enforcement by con-
straining the ability of the police to conduct criminal investigations. The most prominent
conflict concerns the so-called exclusionary rule, which bars the admission in court of improp-
erly obtained evidence. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); see also United States
v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984) (establishing "good faith exception" to exclusionary rule),
discussed infra note 135. See generally Glady, The Exclusionary Rule, 71 GEO. LJ. 434 (1982).
9 The term "informant" generally refers to an individual, often associated with or in-
volved in criminal activity, who provides police with information about such activity. See M.
HARNEY &J. CROSS, THE INFORMER IN LAW ENFORCEMENT viii (2d ed. 1968). Information
provided by anonymous sources, informants unknown to the police, is even more unreliable
than information from known informants. See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2356 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); see also Comment, Anonymous Tps, Corroboration, and Federal Cause: Reconciling the
Spinelli/Draper Dichotomy in Illinois v. Gates, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 99, 107 (1982) (sug-
gesting that anonymous informants be treated as presumptively unreliable).
10 See infia notes 30-36, 38-46 and accompanying text.
11 See Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114; see also infia notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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ity of his information.1 2 The two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test served
both fourth amendment and police interests by allowing informant
based warrants, but only in carefully circumscribed situations.
B. Early Developments in Probable Cause Law
The articulation of the Aguilar-Spineli" doctrine was a culmination
and clarification of major developments in fourth amendment probable
cause law. The Supreme Court clarified the role of the magistrate in
determining probable cause in Johnson v. United States,13 describing it as
"neutral and detached." 14 The magistrate had to determine, indepen-
dently of a police officer's assertions, that probable cause existed.1 5 In
Nathanson v. United States,16 the Court elaborated on what kind of infor-
mation would justify a magistrate's probable cause determination. In
Nathanson, a customs officer applying for a search warrant had sworn to
the magistrate " 'that he ha[d] cause to suspect and [did] believe that'"
contraband was at a certain suspected premises.1 7 The Court held that
the application was fatally defective because "[i]t went upon a mere af-
firmation of suspicion and belief without any statement of adequate
supporting facts."1 8 According to the Court, even a law enforcement
officer, presumptively reliable, must provide the magistrate with more
than bare conclusions.19
In Draper v. United States,20 the Court recognized that hearsay infor-
mation, in the form of an informant's tip, could furnish probable cause.
In Draper, the Court held that a tip from a previously reliable informant,
describing a suspect, in minute detail and predicting that the suspect
would be carrying narcotics at a certain time and place, furnished prob-
able cause for Draper's warrantless arrest. 2 1 The Court reasoned that
12 See Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114; see also infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
13 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
14 Id. at 13-14.
15 See id.
16 290 U.S. 41 (1933).
17 Id. at 44.
18 Id. at 46. Nathanson's proscription of purely conclusory warrant applications was later
embodied in Aguilar-Spinells basis of knowledge requirement. See Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 112-14
(discussed infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text).
19 Nathanson, 290 U.S. at 47. In a similar case, Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S.
480 (1958), the Supreme Court held that arrest warrants, like search warrants cannot be
based on purely conclusory allegations. Id at 485-87. The same probable cause standard
governs search warrants and arrest warrants. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 7, § 3.3,"
at 184-85.
20 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
21 Id. at 312-13. The informant's tip stated that Draper would arrive in Denver on a
train from Chicago on either the eighth or ninth of September; that he would be dressed in a
light colored raincoat, brown slacks, and black shoes; that he characteristically walked with a
fast gait; that he would be carrying a tan zipper bag; and that he would be carrying a quan-
tity of heroin. Id. at 309. The police, by waiting for Draper at the Denver train station, were
able to corroborate all but the last allegation. Id. at 312-13.
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because the police had confirmed the informant's detailed description of
Draper, they could reasonably conclude that he also was carrying the
drugs. 22 Thus, Draper holds that an informant's tip can establish prob-
able cause if police corroborate a substantial number of the tip's
details.23
Finally, in Jones v. United States,24 the Court held that an informant's
tip could furnish probable cause for issuance of a search warrant.2 5 In
Draper, the Court had accepted without discussion 26 the use of informant
tips to establish probable cause. Jones expands Draper by permitting a
tip, standing alone, to furnish probable cause, without any independent
police corroboration. 27 The Court warned, however, that an infor-
mant's tip could serve as a basis for a warrant only "so long as a substan-
tial basis for crediting the hearsay is presented. '28 The Jones Court,
however, did not elaborate on or provide a test for determining what
might constitute a "substantial basis."' 29
C. The Two-Pronged Aguilar-Spinelli Test
1. Enunciation of the Two-Pronged Test: Aguilar v. Texas
In Aguilar v. Texas,30 the Supreme Court picked up on the task left
by Jones and established a two-pronged test for determining when a
"substantial basis" existed for crediting the hearsay information con-
22 Id. at 312-13.
23 Drapeis holding provided support for the Court's articulation of the independent cor-
roboration technique as an indirect way of satisfying the veracity requirement of the Aguilar-
Spinellitest. See Spinel 393 U.S. at 417 (discussed infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text).
24 362 U.S. 257 (1960). In Jones, the Court upheld a search warrant based on a tip from
a reliable informant who had provided correct information to the police in the past and who
had asserted that he personally purchased narcotics from the suspects, known by the police to
be drug addicts. Id. at 266-69 & n.2.
25 362 U.S. at 269.
26 See Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli ?mer, 25 MERCER L.
REv. 741, 744 (1974) (noting that Draper did not adddress itself "significantly" to a qualita-
tive analysis of receivable hearsay); see also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949)
(hearsay accepted as legitimate factor in determining whether a policeman had probable
cause for the warrantless search of an automobile).
27 There was some form of corroboration injones. The corroboration amounted to some
confirmation "by other sources," and to a certain extent by the fact that the suspects were
known drug addicts. 362 U.S. at 268-69. There was, however, no independent police corrob-
oration, as there had been in Draper and as the Court later required in Spinelli See infia notes
44-45 and accompanying text.
28 362 U.S. at 269.
29 See Moylan, supra note 26, at 781. The "substantial basis" language of Jones has had
far-reaching implications. See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2334 (1983) (finding "substan-
tial basis" for concluding that probable cause existed); see also infia notes 77-82 and accompa-
nying text (criticizing Court's reliance in Gates on the "substantial basis" language as
providing a discrete probable cause test).
30 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
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tained in an informant's tip.3 1 According to that test, the officer had to
first present the magistrate with the facts upon which the informant had
based his conclusion that criminal activity had taken place.32 This first
requirement, the "basis of knowledge" prong, required that the informer
have obtained his knowledge by personal observation or in some other
dependable manner rather than through mere rumor.33 Second, the of-
ficer had to provide the magistrate with facts establishing either the in-
formant's credibility or the reliability of his information.3 4 The veracity
prong could be satisfied primarily by a showing that the informant pre-
viously had supplied the police with accurate information. 35 The Court
31 The "two-pronged test," as it was termed in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410
(1969), was contained in a single paragraph:
mhe magistrate must be informed of [1] some of the underlying circum-
stances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he
claimed they were, and [2] some of the underlying circumstances from which
the officer concluded that the informant ... was "credible" or his informa-
tion "reliable."
Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114.
32 Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114. The first prong has been termed the "basis of knowledge"
prong. See Moylan, supra note 26, at 747; see also Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2327. Seegenerally Stanley
v. State, 19 Md. App. 507, 530-31, 303 A.2d 847, 861 (1974) (thorough examination of two-
pronged test).
33 See Note, supra note 7, at 960; see also Note, Probable Cause and The First- Time Informer, 43
U. COLO. L. REv. 357, 359 (1972) (informant must provide "the factual basis on which he
grounds his claim that a crime has been committed"). In United States v. Ventresca, 380
U.S. 102 (1965), the Court did not explicitly apply the Aguilar two-pronged test, but it did
suggest that personal observation by the informant satisfied the basis of knowledge proxy. Id.
at 110-16. Cf Comment, The Undisclosed Informant and the Fourth Amendment: A Search for Mean-
ingfld Standards, 81 YALE L.J. 703, 705 n.16 (1972) (basis of knowledge requirement "places a
premium on personal observation; [i]f the informant claims first-hand knowledge, a detailed
description of the incriminating evidence observed may not be required').
The court in Aguilar suggested an alternate way of satisfying the basis of knowledge re-
quirement: "'[An] affirmative allegation that the affiant spoke with personal knowledge of
the matters contained [in the tip].'" 378 U.S. at 113 (quoting Giordenello v. United States,
357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958)).
In Spineli, the Court provided an indirect way to satisfy the basis of knowledge prong:
abundant detail in the tip. See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416. A tip in sufficient detail would
indicate that the informant "is relying on something more substantial than a casual rumor
• ..or an accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation." Id. See also inJ/a
notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
34 378 U.S. at 114. This second requirement has been termed the "veracity prong." See
Moylan, supra note 26, at 747; see also Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2327. The veracity prong itself has
been subdivided into two parts: the "credibility spur" and the "reliability spur." See Moylan,
supra note 26, at 757.
35 Generally, the state attempts to satisfy the veracity prong by showing that the inform-
ant has a record of providing the police with reliable information, thus fulfilling the credibil-
ity requirement. See, e.g., McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 303-04 (1967) (15 or 16 instances
of providing accurate information over the course of a year sufficient to establish credibility).
If the state cannot establish credibility, it faces the task of establishing the reliability of the
informant. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583-84 (1971) (statement against
informant's own penal interest may establish reliability); Ventresca v. United States, 380 U.S.
102 (1965) (statement by government investigator may be presumptively reliable).
In Spinelli, the Court suggested an additional way to satisfy the veracity prong: in-
dependent police corroboration of some of the details of the tip. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 417-18.
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made it clear that each prong had to be satisfied independently.36 Ap-
plying this two-pronged test to the facts of Aguilar, the Court struck
down a search warrant issued on the basis of a police officer's affidavit,
which recited, in part, merely that "[a]ffiants have received reliable in-
formation from a credible person and do believe that" narcotics are on
the premises to be searched.37
2. Elaboration of the Two-Pronged Test.: Spinelli v. United States
In Spineli v. United States,38 decided four years after Aguilar, the
Court clarified and explained "Aguilar's two-pronged test."'39 Spzelli
emphasized that the basis of knowledge and veracity prongs had to be
established independently; 4° a strong showing of one could not compen-
sate for an insufficient showing of the other. Spinelli expanded the Agui-
lar analysis, however, by providing two ways a defect in either of the
prongs could be cured.
Abundant detail in the tip could remedy a defective showing of
basis of knowledge, provided the detail was as extensive as that in
Draper, which, according to the Court, was a "suitable benchmark.' 4
For a more extensive discussion of this aspect of Spine//i, see infia notes 44-46 and accompany-
ing text.
36 378 U.S. at 114. "[T]he magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying cir-
cumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed
they were, andsome of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that
the informant. . . was 'credible' or his information 'reliable' "). Id. (emphasis added) (foot-
note omitted). See also Harri, 403 U.S. at 592 (Harlan, J.,dissenting) (noting that two prongs
were "analytically severable"); Comment, Anonymous Tips, Corroboration andProbable Cause: Rec-
onciling the Spinelli-Draper Dichotomy in Illinois v. Gates, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 99, 100 (1982)
(magistrate must know source of informant's knowledge, as well as police reasons for crediting
informant's veracity).
37 Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 109. The affidavit presented no indication that the affiant's
source "'spoke with personal knowledge.'" Id at 113. From the face of the affidavit, the
Court could only discern that the informant "merely suspected, believed or concluded that
there were narcotics in petitioner's possession." Id at 113-14. Thus, "[t]he magistrate...
could not 'judge for himself the persuasiveness of the facts relied on . . . to show probable
cause.'" Id. at 114.
38 393 U.S. 410 (1969). In Spinellia search warrant was issued upon an affidavit which
stated that FBI agents had seen the suspect, Spinelli, drive from Illinois to St. Louis and enter
a particular apartment. The agents learned from the telephone company that there were two
phones in this apartment. Neither phone, however, was listed in Spinelli's name. The affida-
vit went on to state that the FBI had been informed by a "reliable informant that . ..
Spinelli [was] operating a handbook and accepting wagers." Id at 413-14.
39 In Spineli, the Court labelled requirements outlined in Aguilar as the "two-pronged
test." Id. at 413. See Moylan, supra note 26, at 747.
40 Spine/li, 393 U.S. at 415-16; see United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. at 592 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Moylan, spra note 26, at 747 (Court in Spinelli first applied basis of knowledge
prong and then independently and distinctly applied the veracity prong).
41 Spineli, 393 U.S. at 416. In Draper, the informant did not indicate how he obtained
the information, but he did report the day and means of the suspect's arrival, the amount of
heroin he would be carrying, and the clothing he would be wearing. According to the Court
in Spinelli, the extent of such detail supported a reasonable inference "that the informant had
gained his information in a reliable way." Id. at 416-17 (footnote omitted).
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The presence of this detail would verify effectively that the informant
relied on more than rumor, thereby fulfilling the goal of the basis of
knowledge requirement.42 This "cure," which came to be known as the
"self-verifying detail technique," departed from Aguilar, "which re-
quired a statement [of] the informer's basis of knowledge and lacked
any provision for the self-verifying detail substitute. '43
The Spinelli Court also indicated that independent police corrobo-
ration of some of the details in a tip could remedy a defective showing of
veracity, provided that, even with corroborated detail, the tip was as
trustworthy as a tip that would pass Aguila?s test without corrobora-
tion.44 Confirmation of some of the tip's details would lend credence to
the remaining, unverified portion.45 According to the Court, neither the
self-verifying detail technique nor the independent corroboration tech-
nique saved the tip at issue in Spinelli.
46
D. Other Developments in the Aguilar-Spinelli Framework
The Supreme Court also dealt with search warrants based on infor-
mants' tips in United States v. Ventresca,47 and United States v. Harris.48 In
Ventresca, decided after Aguilar but before Spinelli, the Court held that a
search warrant based on information supplied by Internal Revenue Ser-
vice agents passed the Aguilar test. The agents' personal observations of
the activity in question satisfied the basis of knowledge prong.49 Fur-
thermore, the Court went beyond Aguilar by finding the veracity prong
satisfied without independent proof of the agents' credibility or the reli-
42 Id. at 416-17.
43 Note, supra note 7, at 962 n.26. Judge Moylan coined the phrase "self-verifying detail
technique." Moylan, supra note 26, at 749.
44 393 U.S. at 415. By referring to the Aguilarstandard, the Court kept the independent
corroboration technique within Aguilats analytical framework. One commentator has sug-
gested that Aguilar itself may have indicated that independent corroboration could satisfy the
veracity prong. See Note, supra note 7, at 960 & n. 10 (citing Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114-15 n.5).
45 See Moylan, supra note 26, at 748. A number of commentators have argued that prob-
able cause based on independent corroboration of details should be limited to situations
where police have confirmed incriminating details because "[c]orroboration of the innocent
detail [alone] does not negate the possibility that the informer is lying about other incriminat-
ing facts." Note, supra note 33, at 362; see also Note, supra note 7, at 967 (arguing that only
corroboration of incriminating allegations should be relevant because "a skillful liar would
always allege some true innocent facts to make his story appear credible") (footnote omitted)
(emphasis in original).
46 The basis of knowledge prong failed because "[t]he tip does not contain a sufficient
statement of the underlying circumstances from which the informer concluded that [defend-
ant] was running a bookmaking operation." 393 U.S. at 416. The veracity prong failed be-
cause allegations that defendants could have used the phones specified by the informant for
illicit purposes "cannot by itself be said to support both the inference that the informer was
generally trustworthy and that he had made his charge against [defendant] on the basis of
information obtained in a reliable way." Id. at 417.
47 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
48 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
49 380 U.S. at 109 (affidavit sets forth a "good many" of underlying circumstances).
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ability of their information. 0 Instead, the Court treated statements
from IRS agents as presumptively reliable, noting that "[o]bservations
of fellow officers of government engaged in a common investigation are
plainly a reliable basis for a warrant applied for by one of their
number."51 In holding such observations plainly reliable, the Court
urged magistrates not to invalidate a warrant "by interpreting the affi-
davit in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner. '"52
In Harris, the Court upheld a warrant based on an informant's tip
even though the affidavit provided no factual basis to support the affi-
ant's assertion that the informant was a "prudent person."' 53 The plu-
rality opinion, written by Chief Justice Burger, indicated that the
veracity requirement was satisfied through two kinds of corroborative
evidence: the suspect's reputation among law enforcement officers of
frequent involvement in criminal activity54 and the fact that the inform-
ant's statements were made against his penal interest.55 Ham's, there-
fore, elaborated on what types of facts police may present to the
magistrate to satisfy the veracity prong; it did not depart from the basic
Aguilar-Spinli standard.56
50 Id. at 111.
51 Id. (footnote omitted). See aso Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2356 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (po-
lice are presumptively reliable). Cf. Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. at 47 (police officer
must present magistrate with more than conclusory allegations).
52 380 U.S. at 108-09. The Court in Gates erroneously seized on this dictum as support-
ing a "totality of circumstances" approach. 103 S. Ct. at 2333. Ste infra notes 83-86 and
accompanying text.
53 403 U.S. at 575.
54 Id. at 583. The assertion in Harris that reputation may be corroborative at first glance
seems inconsistent with Spi'neli In Spinelli; the Court discounted evidence that the suspect
there was "a known gambler." 393 U.S. at 418-19. Furthermore, the Harris plurality disap-
proved Spineli to the extent it disallowed the use of reputation. 403 U.S. at 583. The two
cases, however, are distinguishable. The assertion of the suspect's reputation in Spineli was
unsupported by any facts; but in Harris, the affidavit detailed the informant's knowledge of
Harris' reputation and indicated that others held a similar opinion. Id. at 575. See also Moy-
Ian, supra note 26, at 785 n.130. But see Harris, 403 U.S. at 590-91.
55 403 U.S. at 583. This inference has been criticized sharply by one commentator, who
argued that because many informants are compensated for their information with an assur-
ance of nonprosecution or leniency, superficially incriminating statements may actually not
be against penal interest. See Comment, supra note 33, at 707 n.28.
56 The plurality opinion does not, however, demonstrate a strong commitment to the
Aguilar-Spinelli test. At one point, the plurality suggested that the fact that the informant
stated he observed the activity in question could help satisfy the veracity requirement. 403
U.S. at 581. Such a suggestion departs from the "analytical severability" of the two prongs of
the Aguilar-Spinelli test. See Harris, 403 U.S. at 572 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The potential questions raised by this language do not seem to have undermined the
Aguilar-Spine/li test, as many lower courts in cases arising subsequent to Harris have required
independent satisfaction of each of the two prongs of the test. See, e.g., Stanley v. State, 19
Md. App. 507, 313 A.2d 847 (Md. App. 1974).
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In May 1978, the Bloomingdale, Illinois, Police Department re-
ceived by mail an anonymous letter stating that a local couple, Susan
and Lance Gates, made their living strictly by selling illegal drugs and
had over $100,000 worth of drugs in the basement of their home. The
letter also detailed the typical modus operandi of the couple. The Gates
periodically would travel to Florida, load a car with drugs and return to
Bloomingdale. The letter predicted the date of the couple's next trip
and described their travel arrangements. According to the informant,
Susan Gates would not be accompanying her husband on the trip.58
Police confirmed that Lance Gates had made a plane reservation to
Florida, flown down, checked into a hotel, and left early the next morn-
ing in a car heading north on an interstate road with an unidentified
woman, who later turned out to be his wife. Thus, one detail of the tip
was erroneous, because Ms. Gates did accompany her husband on the
return trip. On the basis of the letter and the subsequent police corrob-
oration, the police obtained a search warrant for the Gates' house and
car. A search conducted upon the couple's return from Florida pro-
duced a substantial quantity of illegal drugs.59
Prior to the Gates' trial for violating state drug laws, the Court
suppressed all evidence obtained in the search on the ground that the
warrant was not supported by probable cause.60 The Illinois Supreme
Court affirmed the suppression order reasoning that because the tip was
from an anonymous source, and, because the letter contained mere con-
clusions, the tip failed to satisfy the Aguilar two-pronged test either di-
rectly or by way of the Spinelli self-verifying detail and independent
corroboration techniques. 6' The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to decide whether the Illinois court correctly decided that the
tip did not establish probable cause.6 2 The Court reversed in an opinion
written by Justice Rehnquist.63
57 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
58 Id. at 2325.
59 Id. at 2325-26.
60 See People v. Gates, 85 Ill. 2d 376, 381, 423 N.E.2d 887, 889 (1981).
61 Id. at 390, 423 N.E.2d at 893. According to the Illinois Supreme Court, the tip did
not directly satisfy the Aguilar-Spineli test because it came from an anonymous source and
stated mere conclusions. Id at 383-86, 423 N.E.2d at 890-91. The court also found that
neither of Spinelh's remedial measures was satisfied. The basis of knowledge prong was not
satisfied because the amount of detail in the tip did not approach the amount of detail in the
tip in Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). See Gates, 85 Ill. 2d at 389, 423 N.E.2d at
893. The veracity prong was not satisfied because the police had corroborated only innocent
details. See Gates, 85 Ill. 2d at 390, 423 N.E.2d at 893. For a discussion of these two provisions
of Spinelli, see supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
62 103 S. Ct. at 2321.
63 103 S. Ct. at 2336. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and
O'Connor joined Justice Rehnquist's opinion.
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The Gates majority held that the magistrate issuing the warrant had
a "substantial basis" for concluding that probable cause existed. 64 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the two-pronged Aguilar-
Spinelli test in favor of a "totality of circumstances" approach that it
claimed "traditionally has informed probable cause determinations. '65
Although the majority agreed with the Illinois court that the tip, stand-
ing alone, did not provide probable cause, 66 it did find that "the totality
of circumstances" provided a "substantial basis" for finding probable
cause.67 According to the majority, basis of knowledge and veracity
were not irrelevant to the probable cause inquiry but were best under-
stood as "closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the
common-sense practical question [of] whether there is a 'probable
cause.' "68 The majority argued that basis of knowledge and veracity
should not be analyzed independently; instead, a strong showing of one
should be able to compensate for a deficiency in the other.69 The major-
ity implied that only the totality of circumstances approach could allevi-
ate what it perceived as the undue rigidity and over-technicality of the
two-pronged test.70
64 Id at 2336. The majority borrowed the "substantial basis" term from Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (there was "substantial basis" to conclude that narcotics were
present in place to be searched). See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. For criticism
of the Court's use ofJones, see injfa notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
65 Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2332. This Note rejects the Court's contention that a "totality of
circumstances" approach has traditionally guided probable cause determinations. See infra
notes 74-91 and accompanying text.
Although abandoning the Aguilar-Spine/li test, the Court refrained from overruling the
decisions themselves. Arguably, the outcome of each case, a finding of no probable cause,
would be the same under Gates's "totality of circumstances" approach.
66 See 103 S. Ct. at 2326.
67 The factors relied on by the Court in determining that the "totality of circumstances"
supported a finding of probable cause, included "extensive" detail in the tip, see id. at 2334,
the fact that the informer predicted a third party's future actions, sree id, police corroboration
of some of the details, id. at 2334-35, and the suspiciousness of some of the corroborated facts.
Id. at 2334. In their totality, these factors certainly do not overwhelmingly indicate probable
cause for a search or seizure. The detail in the tip was not particularly extensive, nor were the
corroborated facts, in themselves, or even in context, notably suspicious. Nor were the facts
that the Gates flew to Florida, "well-known as a source of. . . illegal drugs," see id., and that
they left on a highway "used by travelers from South Florida to Chicago," see id at 2326,
particularly enlightening. These factors in their totality did warrant some suspicion but pos-
sibly not enough to overcome the inherent suspiciousness of the anonymous tip. See id. at
2360-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68 Id at 2328. The majority went out of its way to emphasize that probable cause is "a
fluid concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts," ste
id, but the Court failed to demonstrate that the two-pronged test conflicted with such a
characterization of probable cause. See infra notes 92-125 and accompanying text.
69 See 103 S. Ct. at 2329-30.
70 See id at 2328-32. This Note contends that the two-pronged test was not unduly rigid
or technical. See infia notes 92-125 and accompanying text.
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice White criticized the majority for abandoning
the Aguilar-Spinedlitest. 103 S. Ct. at 2347 (White, J., concurring). According to White, it was
not necessary to abolish the test either to alleviate confusion in the lower courts or to reverse
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III
ANALYSIS
A. - The Gates Court's Failed Attempt to Justify its Rejection of the
Aguilar-Spinelli Two-Pronged Test
The Gates Court's justifications for abandoning the two-pronged
test do not withstand close scrutiny. The majority failed to substantiate
its contention that a totality of circumstances approach traditionally has
guided probable cause determinations. 7' It also failed to demonstrate
that the two-pronged test was too rigid and technical for effective use by
law enforcement officials. 72
1. The Court's Failure to Identif a Pre-existing Totality of
Circumstances Approach
The majority in Gates misread several prior probable cause deci-
sions in order to "reaffirm" a "traditional" totality of circumstances test.
The majority claimed a totality of circumstances approach was "far
more consistent with [the Court's] prior treatment of probable cause
than. . . any rigid demand that specific 'tests' be satisfied by every in-
formant's tip." 73 None of the cases cited by the Court applied a totality
of circumstances approach or anything analogous to it. Moreover, the
Aguilar-Spinelli test did not depart from the principles of the cases relied
on by the Gates majority.
The Gates Court cited Draper v. United States74 to support its assertion
that a totality of circumstances approach "traditionally" guided prob-
able cause determinations of informants' tips. 75 The Draper Court never
revealed what "test," if any, it used to determine that the tip in that case
established probable cause. Nonetheless, the Court's exclusive reliance
on the abundant detail in the tip and the police corroboration of most of
the details closely resembled Spinelli's self-verifying detail and indepen-
dent corroboration techniques. 76 Therefore, the Aguilar-Spinelli test did
the Illinois court. See id. at 2350-51. Instead, White argued that the Court should have pre-
served and clarified the two-pronged test. Id. at 2350-51. Moreover, he feared the majority's
decision may "foretell the evisceration of the probable cause standard." Id. at 2350.
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, argued that the ma-
jority should not have eliminated the two-pronged test. See id at 2351 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Stevens, in a separate dissent joined by Justice Brennan, argued that the error in
the informant's letter, see supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text, rendered the search war-
rant invalid under the majority's "totality of circumstances" test. See 103 S. Ct. at 2361-62
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
71 See infra notes 73-91 and accompanying text.
72 See infra notes 92-124 and accompanying text.
73 Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2328.
74 358 U.S. 307 (1959). See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
75 See 103 S. Ct. at 2334.
76 For a discussion of Sp'nell, see supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
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not depart from Draper; indeed, Draper fits neatly into the Aguilar-Spineli
analytical framework.
The Gates majority seized on the "substantial basis for crediting
hearsay" language of Jones v. United States77 as evidence of a totality of
circumstances approach.7 8 In Jones, however, the "substantial basis"
language referred solely to the issue of whether the informant's tip could
be considered reliable.79 The affidavit on its face indicated how the in-
formant had acquired the information.80 The Jones Court sought to de-
termine only whether there was a "substantial basis" for crediting the
informant's statement.81 Aguilar then built the two-pronged test on the
foundation laid by Jones.82
Justice Rehnquist interpreted the admonition in United States v. Ven-
tresca83 not to interpret affidavits for search warrants "in a hypertechni-
cal rather than a common sense manner," as providing a distinct
alternative to the two-pronged Aguilar test.84 In Ventresca, however, the
Court's directive to use common sense comes into play only after the
Court has been informed of some of the underlying circumstances on
which an informant's tip is based and facts suggesting the informant is
credible or his information reliable.8 5 Therefore, the Ventresca Court de-
manded information tending to establish Aguilar's basis of knowledge
and veracity prongs.8 6 Moreover, the timing of the Court's decision in
Ventresca, between Aguilar and Spineli, neither of which espouse any al-
ternative to strict compliance with the two-pronged test, weakens the
majority's assertion.
Finally, the Gates majority relied on United States v. farris87 in sup-
port of a totality of circumstances test.88 In fact, the plurality opinion in
Harris did not depart from the Aguilar-Spinelli framework. Both Chief
Justice Burger, writing for the plurality, and Justice Harlan, who dis-
sented, acknowledged that the affidavit satisfied the basis of knowledge
77 362 U.S. 257 (1960). See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
78 See 103 S. Ct. at 2331.
79 Jones, 362 U.S. at 271-72.
80 Id. at 267-68 n.2.
81 Id. at 271-72; see also Moylan, supra note 26, at 781-82.
82 See 378 U.S. at 114-15; see also Moylan, supra note 26, at 781 ("the two-pronged test
fleshed out the earlier phrase 'a substantial basis for crediting' "); Comment, supra note 33, at
705 (Aguilar built its two-pronged test on the foundation laid by Jones).
83 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
84 See id. at 109, quoted in Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2331; see also Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2333.
85 380 U.S. at 108-09.
86 As Judge Moylan noted, "Ventrescal's] oft quoted directive comes into play only after
Aguila~s standards have first been met." Moylan, supra note 26, at 783; see also Note, supra
note 7, at 961 n.20 (The Court "probably meant only that common sense should be used in
determining whether sufficient circumstances have been set forth to pass each of the tests
required by Aguilar.').
87 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
88 Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2329.
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requirement.8 9 Nor was there any disagreement in Harris that the verac-
ity requirement also had to be established independently.90 The debate
in Haris was merely over the means by which the veracity prong could
be satisfied.9 '
Thus, the flaw in the Gates Court's "reaffirmation" of a totality of
circumstances approach lay in its failure to recognize that the decisions
upon which it was relying were inconsistent with such an approach.
None of those cases applied a totality of circumstances approach.
2. The Courts Erroneous Perception of the Aguilar-Spinelli Test as
Unduly Rigid and Overy Technical
The Gates Court also justified its rejection of the Aguilar-Spinelli two-
pronged test on the ground that the test was too rigid and technical. 92
According to the Court, the test was inflexible because it required in-
dependent verification of the basis of knowledge on the one hand and
veracity on the other.93 The majority also concluded that the overly
technical nature of the test was incompatible with the law enforcement
setting in which warrant decisions are made. 94 The Court failed to pro-
vide adequate justification for either of these conclusions.
The Court failed adequately to consider the rationale underlying
the requirement that the basis of knowledge and veracity prongs be sat-
isfied independently. The two prongs protect fourth amendment rights
from different risks. The basis of knowledge prong guards against the
use of purely conclusory information;95 the veracity prong ensures that
there is some reason to trust the person who supplies the information. 96
Because the veracity prong and the basis of knowledge prong each serve
a different function, any determination of probable cause should ac-
count for the prongs independently. An analogy between the role of the
89 See Harris, 403 U.S. at 578-79 (affidavit recounts "personal and recent observations");
id. at 589 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("the affidavit sets forth sufficient data to permit a magis-
trate to determine that, if the informer was likely telling the truth, information adequate to
support a finding of probable cause was likely obtained in a reliable fashion"). See also Moy-
Ian, supra note 26, at 784 (all opinions "agreed that Aguilars 'basis of knowledge' prong was
preeminently satisfied").
90 See Ham', 403 U.S. at 579 ("a bare statement by an affiant that he believed the in-
formant to be truthful would not, in itself, provide afactual basis for crediting the report of an
unnamed informant") (emphasis in original); see a/so Moylan, supra note 26, at 784.
91 The plurality declared that a statement against penal interest could help satisfy the
veracity prong, 408 U.S. at 583-84, a proposition condemned by Justice Harlan in dissent. See
id at 594-96 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
92 See 103 S. Ct. at 2328-32.
93 See id. at 2327-40. The Court stated that "the [Aguilar-Spineli] test has encouraged an
excessively technical dissection of informants' tips, with undue attention being focused on
isolated issues that cannot be sensibly divorced from the other facts presented to the magis-
trate." Id at 2330 (footnote omitted).
94 See id. at 2330-31.
95 See Note, supra note 7, at 960 n.9.
96 See Moylan, supra note 26, at 757-59.
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magistrate in determining probable cause and the role of the fact finder
in determining guilt demonstrates the necessity for establishing each
prong separately. Both determinations call for an assessment of the
credibility of those who furnish the information, and, if the source is
credited, for a weighing of the information itself.97 Even the Gates ma-
jority recognized the complementary roles played by the basis of knowl-
edge and veracity requirements, noting that both factors are "highly
relevant" in a probable cause inquiry.98
Requiring that the magistrate evaluate an informant's tip on the
basis of both prongs ensures that only well-founded information from a
credible source will be able to support a finding of probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant. 99 By depriving the two prongs of their in-
dependent status, the Gates majority has neutralized the Aguilar-Spinelli
test's protection against the issuance of warrants based on purely con-
clusory information provided by potentially unreliable informants.
The Gates majority also contended that the Aguilar-Spineli test de-
prived law enforcement officials of the use of potentially valuable infor-
mation by leaving "virtually no place for anonymous [tips]."100 This
argument is erroneous in two respects. First, the Aguilar-Spinelli test did
not bar the use of anonymous tips to provide probable cause. Such tips
merely would have to satisfy Spinel/'s independent corroboration tech-
nique, 01 because nothing can be discerned about the veracity of an
anonymous informant. Second, the Court ignored the inherently suspi-
cious nature of tips from anonymous informants. Such tips deserve par-
ticularly stringent scrutiny because of their suspicious origin.10 2
The Court provided three examples to demonstrate that the basis
of knowledge and veracity prongs should not be treated as independent
requirements.10 3 These examples, however, ignore fourth amendment
protections 10 4 and are inconsistent with probable cause decisions that
the Court expressly endorsed in Gates. In the first example, the majority
contended that a previously reliable informant presumptively satisfied
the basis of knowledge requirement. 10 5 Under such an approach, a
97 See Moylan, supra note 26, at 743. Judge Moylan does concede, however, that his
analogy is "less than perfect." Id.
98 See 103 S. Ct. at 2327. The Court stated: "We agree with the Illinois Supreme Court
that an informant's 'veracity,' 'reliability,' and 'basis of knowledge' are all highly relevant in
determining the value of his report." Id.
99 See Moylan, supra note 26, at 750-52.
100 Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2331-32.
101 See Comment, supra note 9, at 107.
102 See id. ("A tip from an anonymous informant is presumptively unreliable because the
police and the magistrate cannot know the motives of the anonymous informant-he may be
motivated by a sense of civic duty, revenge, or a desire to eliminate criminal competition.")
(footnote omitted).
103 See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2329-30.
104 See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
105 See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2329. The Court stated that:
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purely conclusory statement by a police officer known to be honest and
reliable would also be acceptable. 10 6 In Nathanson v. United States,107
however, the Court held that the unsupported assertions of a police of-
ficer can never furnish probable cause. '08 Thus, as Justice White noted
in his concurring opinion, "[i]t would be 'quixotic' if a similar statement
from an honest informant, but not one from an honest [police] officer
could furnish probable cause."' 0 9 The court's first example at best es-
tablishes a curious inconsistency and at worst eliminates Nathanson's val-
uable protection against overreaching by the police.
As its second example, the Court stated that a tip from an unques-
tionably honest citizen would not require rigid scrutiny of the basis of
knowledge requirement10 In support, the Court cited its opinion in
Adams v. Williams."' Adams, however, concerned a Terry-stop,112 not a
determination of probable cause. The standard under which a police-
man may conduct a Tery-stop, a "reasonable suspicion" of criminal ac-
tivity, is less stringent than the probable cause standard."13
Furthermore, in Adams, the policeman received the tip in question from
a person he knew at 2:15 A. M. in a high crime area. 1 4 The Court did
not indicate whether the informant was an "unquestionably honest citi-
zen;" it merely stated that the informant had provided information in
the past. 15 Consequently, the Court in Adams recognized that the tip at
issue "may have been insufficient for a . . . search warrant."' "1 6
The Court's final example states that a highly detailed tip could
satisfy the veracity requirement as well as the basis of knowledge re-
quirement. 17 The specificity of a tip sheds no light on veracity 18 be-
[I]f, for example, a particular informant is known for the unusual reliability of
his predictions of certain types of criminal activities in a locality, his failure, in
a particular case, to thoroughly set forth the basis of his knowledge surely
should not serve as an absolute bar to a finding of probable cause based on his
tip.
Id
106 See LaFave, Nine X9y Decirions Expand Authority to Search and Seize, 69 A.B.A. J. 1742,
1744 (1983).
107 290 U.S. 41 (1933).
108 See id. at 47; see also Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2358 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Other cases
have also held that the unsupported assertions of a police officer cannot support a finding of
probable cause. See, e.g., Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 564-65 (1971); Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257, 269 (1960); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
109 103 S. Ct. at 2350 (White, J., concurring).
11o Id at 2329.
''' 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
112 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Terry allows police to stop and question a sus-
pect in the absence of grounds for an arrest if there is a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. Id at 20-27; see W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 7, § 3.8, at 292-93.
113 See Adams, 407 U.S. at 147.
114 Adams, 407 U.S. at 144-45.
115 Id at 146-47.
116 Id at 147 (citations omitted).
117 See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2329-30.
118 See LaFave, supra note 106, at 1744.
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cause, as one court has noted, "[i]f the informant were concocting a
story out of the whole cloth, he could fabricate in fine detail as easily as
with rough brush strokes."" 9 The three examples, therefore, weaken
rather than support the Court's rationale for treating the two prongs
interdependently.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Gates majority, contended that
the two-pronged test substantially impaired law enforcement. He as-
serted that the test seriously impeded "'the most basic function of any
government': 'to provide for the security of the individual and his prop-
erty.' "120 This argument shares the same weakness as the Court's char-
acterization of the two-pronged test as too rigid; the criticism merely
reflects the Court's advancement of police interests while ignoring an-
other "basic function" of any government: protecting people from un-
warranted incursions of their privacy. 21
Finally, the majority argued that the "built-in subtleties"' 122 of the
two-pronged test were likely to confuse magistrates, who are typically
neither lawyers nor judges.' 23 The two-pronged test, however, assisted
magistrates in determining probable cause by providing an analytical
framework within which the nonlawyer could work.124 The amorphous
totality of circumstances approach will be far more confusing to magis-
trates because it is void of built-in guidelines.
B. The Future of Search Warrants Based on Informants' Tips
Illinois v. Gates will alter the balance between law enforcement and
probable cause interests reflected in the Aguilar-Spinellitwo-pronged test.
The totality of circumstances approach advances police interests at the
expense of privacy interests protected by the fourth amendment. The
new approach will introduce mass confusion into lower court determina-
tions of probable cause and make it difficult for reviewing courts to
overturn a magistrate's determination of probable cause.
119 Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 508, 533, 313 A.2d 847, 862 (Ct. Spec. Apps. 1974)
(Moylan, J.).
120 See 103 S. Ct. at 2331 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 539 (1966)).
121 See generall Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
122 103 S. Ct. at 2331 (citing Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 507, 528, 313 A.2d 847, 860
(Md. App. 1974)). Judge Moylan wrote the Stanley opinion, which the Gates Court begrudg-
ingly characterized as "conscientiously attempting to apply the 'two-pronged test.' " 103 S.
Ct. at 2327 n.4. As the Gates majority noted, Judge Moylan's opinion in Stanley observed that
"the built-in subtleties of the two-pronged test are such . . . that a slipshod application calls
down upon us the fury of Murphy's Law[:] '[w]hat can go wrong, will go wrong.'" 19 Md.
App. at 528 & n.21, 313 A.2d at 860 & n.21. Contrary to the Court's implication, however,
Judge Moylan made this observation in the context of arguing for a rigorous, not loosened,
application of the Aguilar test. Id at 528, 313 A.2d at 860.
123 See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2330; see also Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 348-50
(1972).
124 See LaFave, supra note 106, at 1743.
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The decision in Gates does not simply replace the two-pronged test
with a comparable approach as the Court contends. The totality of cir-
cumstances approach adopted in Gates will make it easier for police to
obtain warrants based on tips from informants.1 25 The new approach
will permit magistrates to issue more warrants than the two-pronged
test. Under the Aguilar-Spinelli test, a magistrate had to make two spe-
cific findings before considering whether a tip furnished probable cause.
Under the standardless "totality of circumstances" approach, a magis-
trate has virtually unlimited discretion in determining whether an in-
formant's tip supports a finding of probable cause.
The totality of circumstances approach will allow magistrates to
find probable cause more frequently for two reasons. First, the lack of
built-in guidelines will permit magistrates to rely on data wholly unre-
lated to determining whether probable cause exists.126 Second, without
the two-pronged test's requirement that the magistrate separately evalu-
ate an informant's basis of knowledge and credibility, police officers may
unduly influence a magistrate's decision whether to issue a warrant.127
The often frenzied setting in which warrant decisions are made increases
the risk of undue influence because magistrates are now not required to
make specific findings, and more likely will rely, without question,
merely on a police officer's allegation of probable cause. Thus, in many
cases, the totality of circumstances approach effectively may shift the
responsibility for determining when a tip provides probable cause from
the magistrate to the investigating officer. A police officer, however,
"engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime"' 2 8
will not often give more than perfunctory consideration to a suspect's
fourth amendment rights.'2 9
The decision in Gates will limit significantly court review of magis-
trates' decisions.130 It is well settled that reviewing courts must give
great deference to a magistrate's determination of probable cause. 131 At
the same time, since the police are the target of fourth amendment limi-
tations, the primary responsibility for protecting fourth amendment
125 The most likely result of Gates will be an increase in the number of warrants issued.
Conceivably, however, fewer warrants will be issued, because magistrates may cautiously ap-
ply the new, confusing standard. Whatever the empirical outcome, the demonstration in
Gates of a permissive attitude toward law enforcement officials is potentially further reaching
than the number of warrants issued.
126 See 103 S. Ct. at 2359 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
127 See id. Under the two-pronged test, the magistrate evaluated a police officer's asser-
tion of probable cause against an objective standard. Without the objective standards of
Aguilar-Spinel, magistrates, particularly acquiescent ones, may have more trouble evaluating
warrant applications.
128 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. at 13-14.
129 See id.
130 See generaly The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1, 184 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as 1982 Term].
131 See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. at 419.
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rights lies with the courts. 3 2 The absence of clear standards in the total-
ity of circumstances approach will make it extremely difficult for a re-
viewing court to overcome the presumption in favor of a magistrate's
decision. I33 Because Gales virtually insulates the magistrate's decision
from judicial review, the independence of his decision must be pro-
tected. The two-pronged test, however, unlike the totality of circum-
stances approach, provided such protection.
The two practical effects of Gales, increasing reliance by magistrates
on police officers' contentions and increasing insulation of a magistrate's
decision from judicial review, typify the Burger Court's advancement of
law enforcement interests at the expense of fourth amendment protec-
tions. A further indication of this advancement was the Court's adop-
tion after Gates of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in
United States v. Leon.13 4 In that case, the Court held that even when a
reviewing court overturns a magistrate's finding of probable cause, the
evidence seized under such an invalid warrant is nonetheless admissible
when the law enforcement officials' "reliance on the magistrate's deter-
mination of probable cause was objectively reasonable."'13 5
CONCLUSION
Under the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test, hearsay statements
from an informant could furnish probable cause for a magistrate to issue
a warrant only if the warrant affidavit provided a factual indication of
the informant's credibility or the reliability of his information. Deci-
sions from the Supreme Court applying the test demonstrated its flexi-
bility and utility in securing fourth amendment rights.
In Illinois v. Gates,'36 the Court ignored opportunities to refine and
132 See Grinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
133 See 1982 Term, supra note 130, at 184.
134 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
135 Id at 3423. See also Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984). In Leon, the
magistrate's finding of probable cause was disapproved by the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, which applied the Aguilar-Spinelti test.
In Leon and Sheppard, the Court adopted the so-called "good faith" exception to the ex-
clusionary rule. Under the exclusionary rule, evidence seized during searches conducted
without probable cause was not admissible at trial. See supra note 8. Under this long-urged
exception, see, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 596-502 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring);
United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 840-46 (5th Cir. 1980); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
ATrORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, FINAL REPORT 90-94 (1981), such
evidence is not excluded if the police had a good faith belief that a warrant was supported by
probable cause. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3423, Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. at 3428.
136 See 1982 Tm, supra note 130, at 185. In Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S. Ct. 2085
(1984), the Court reaffirmed its abandonment of the Aguilar-Spinelli test and adoption of a
"totality of circumstances" approach. The Court also re-emphasized that "the task of a re-
viewing court is not to conduct a de nova determination of probable cause, but only to deter-
mine whether there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the magistrate's decision
to issue the warrant." Id. at 2085-86.
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clarify this workable test. Driven by a desire to broaden police access to
informant based search warrants, the Court replaced the two-pronged
test with an amorphous "totality of circumstances" approach, that the
Court erroneously argued traditionally has guided its past determina-
tion of probable cause. The reasons the Court advanced for abandoning
the two-pronged test are unconvincing and camouflage the impact of
the decision; these reasons conflict with well-established decisions, reaf-
firmed elsewhere in the opinion. Gates thus redefines the traditionally
respected balance between police and fourth amendment interests to the
detriment of privacy interests protected by the fourth amendment.
Alexander P. Woolcot
